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Privacy

Privacy starts with an honest account of what exists today.

This project page separates the public presentation website from future Huddle product, research and family-data processing.

A family coordinating an ordinary weekday morning at home
Why this matters
Explain the current privacy boundary, identify the facts that still require verification and prevent future product intentions from being presented as current processing practices.
Who this page is for
Public-site visitors, prospective research participants, families, organisations, reviewers and privacy specialists

Two contexts

The public website and the future product need separate promises.

Current scope

The public `.com` site explains the Huddle project and its prototype direction. It should describe only the data flows that are actually present on the deployed website, such as a verified contact route, technical delivery or an approved research-interest form if and when those functions exist.

Future accounts, family profiles, child context, recommendations, marketplace activity and institutional learning require separate purpose-specific notices before they are processed. A product concept is not evidence that those data operations are active today.

Researching
A family turning information on a screen into a shared plan for real life
01Public website today

This project page separates the public presentation website from future Huddle product, research and family-data processing.

02Future family product

Explain the current privacy boundary, identify the facts that still require verification and prevent future product intentions from being presented as current processing practices.

Privacy by design

Collect less. Explain the purpose. Keep the family in control.

Data minimisation

Until a verified notice and secure purpose-specific route are published, visitors should not send child-identifying information, health details, safeguarding reports, credentials, case files or other sensitive material through general contact fields.

Huddle's intended design principles include purpose limitation, adult control, separation of household and institutional visibility, restricted access and limited retention. These remain design commitments requiring legal, privacy, safeguarding and technical validation.

Available in prototype
  1. 01Purpose before collection
  2. 02Minimum necessary data
  3. 03Separate consent and notices
  4. 04Correction, deletion and retention

Before production

What remains to be verified

A complete privacy notice needs named facts, not placeholders or assumptions.

Before production publication, the responsible owner must verify the site publisher, controller, contact route, purposes, data categories, lawful bases, recipients and processors, international transfers, retention, security measures and procedures for exercising rights.

No registered company identity, data-protection officer, processor list, legal basis, retention period, production processing or regulatory compliance is confirmed by this draft. Final wording requires owner and specialist legal and privacy review against the deployed system.

Researching
Research and project partners reviewing evidence together
04

Purpose and provenance

Every data item needs a source, purpose, owner and end date.

Future product notices should distinguish family-entered information, provider facts, public sources, technical records and generated inferences. The purpose and lawful basis may differ for account operation, research, support, safety, commerce and aggregate institutional learning; one consent must not silently authorise every use.

Families should be able to understand access, correction, deletion, portability, objection and withdrawal routes where they apply. Requests need an authenticated, safe process that does not expose another household member or erase records that must be retained for a lawful reason without explanation.

Planned
05

Sensitive context

Huddle should not infer more about a family than the task requires.

Household context may reveal disability, finances, migration, religion, health, relationships or a child’s routine even when those fields are not requested directly. Product design should avoid combining ordinary signals into a sensitive profile and should prohibit family, parent, child and social scoring.

Location should use the least precise form that solves the task. Discovery may need an area, travel estimate or chosen starting point; it does not automatically justify background tracking, a location history or institutional access to where a family goes.

Planned
06

Assessment before processing

High-risk processing needs an assessment before code or consent makes it appear acceptable.

A DPIA or equivalent specialist review may be required for child-related context, systematic recommendation, sensitive inference, monitoring, location, large-scale research or institutional analytics. The review should map necessity, proportionality, threats, affected people, mitigations, residual risk and the accountable approval decision.

Security design should cover identity, role-based access, encryption, logging, backups, deletion, vendor control, testing, breach handling and recovery. These are requirements for future operation; this page does not certify that a production family-data system currently exists or complies with a named regime.

Researching
Families and neighbours sharing activities in a Norwegian courtyard

The next responsible step

Explain the current privacy boundary, identify the facts that still require verification and prevent future product intentions from being presented as current processing practices.

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